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The development process of Chinese market economy has its own particularity. 
The economic system reform under the leadership of the government has a distinctive 
administrative doctrine. The important resources for the survival and developments of 
enterprises are under the charge of government. As a rising star in the market economy, 
private enterprises are bearing more and more social responsibility. However, in the 
process of development, they also gradually exposed some problems. Financing 
constraints and inefficient investments have become the main bottleneck, which restrict 
the further developments and expansions of private enterprises. Compared with the 
state-owned enterprises, private enterprises have a small size and face multiple 
constraints, such as the industrial permissions. Moreover, their developments also vary 
greatly. In addition, due to its status, private enterprises surfer lots of discriminations 
when participating in the economy. The relationship culture is a common phenomenon 
in China. Under this background, in order to obtain more resources and the ease of 
doing business, more and more private enterprises began to seek and establish political 
connections to make up the inherent shortage of status. Chinese scholars’ research on 
political connections started late and their conclusions are unable to agree on which is 
right. At present, the academic circles generally tend to think that political connections 
is helpful to alleviate the financing constraints of private enterprises, but as for the 
relationship between political connections and enterprises’ over-investment and firm 
performance, the views of different scholars still differ. 
Basing on the asymmetric information theory, the relationship lending theory, the 
rent-seeking theory and the grabbing hand theory, and the comprehensive analysis of 
the existing literatures, this paper puts forward the following views: first, the political 
connections can play the role of signal transduction, which reduces information 
asymmetry and eliminates the insecurity of suppliers. The politically connected 
enterprises can easily obtain important resources through their non-institutional 
advantages, which also brings external financing convenience and then alleviates 















mechanism focus on political performance, in order to maintain its relationship with 
government, politically connected enterprises may become the tool for driving up local 
GDP and then make some inefficient investment. Meanwhile, the enterprises’ budget 
constraints are softening because of the resource effect of political connections, the 
politically connected enterprises may blindly invest in some ineffective projects, which 
results in over-investment. Third, as an informal alternative mechanism of institution, 
the political connections can bring property protection, access to resources, 
improvement of efficiency, financing convenience, tax incentives and other benefits to 
the enterprises, which improves enterprises’ performance. 
The analysis and verification of the above points of views lays a solid theoretical 
foundation for the deep-going research of this paper. When analyzing the existing 
literatures, the author noticed that there are some defects. Specifically, existing 
literatures have been generally researching the relationship between political 
connections and only one aspect of enterprises’ financial behavior, while ignoring the 
effect on the whole enterprise. In fact, political connections’ effect on corporate 
financial behavior should be comprehensive, multidimensional. The enterprise’s 
financial behaviors interact with each other. Analyzing the relationship between 
political connections and an individual financial behavior is clearly not rigorous enough, 
which is probably the reason for the different conclusions of existing research. 
Therefore, from the perspectives of financing constraints and over-investments, and 
combining them, taking 5247 observations from 1312 A share listed private enterprises 
from China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market for the period 
2005~2014 as sample, this paper researches the difference among how the political 
connections affect operating performance of private enterprises with different 
characteristics and gets the following conclusions: among different private enterprises, 
the effect of political connections to improve business performance are different. For 
the private enterprises with serious financing constraints and low level of over-
investment, the promotion of political connections to enterprises’ performance is more 
significant. In addition, this paper also carries on the division to the political 















the central political connections. 
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